of which he is administrator. *Willard v. Bassett,* 27 Ill. 37. A trustee can make no profit out of his office, for the reason that he shall not be placed in any position where his interest may be opposed to duty. *Hough* v. *Harvay,* 71 Ill. 72. Nor can he recover for professional services even when the costs are not payable out of the trust funds. *In re Reed,* 12 N. Y. St. Rep. 139. When counsel fees are allowed to an administrator they are not the usual professional charges, but a fair and reasonable allowance in view of all the facts of the particular case. *Clark v. Knox,* 70 Ala. 529.

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES—TRANSFERS INVALID—INSOLVENCY.—TRANSFER AS SECURITY.—GODFREY FRANK & CO., ET AL., V. DOUGHTY, 47 So. 643 (MISS.).—*Held,* that though a grantor was financially embarrassed and was indebted to others when he executed a deed of trust on land to his wife, who was also a creditor, the trust deed being for the grantee's sole benefit to secure a valid debt without any benefit being reserved to the grantor, was not in fraud of the other creditors.

The general rule is that no debtor can legally make any conveyance which will place his property beyond the reach of his creditors without their consent. *De Wolf v. Sprague Manufacturing Co.,* 49 Conn. 282. However, a failing or insolvent debtor may select one or more of his creditors and pay them in full to the exclusion of any others, provided he retains no benefit himself beyond what the law allows or secures to him. *McDowell v. Steele,* 29 Fed. 738. But should the preferred creditor be the wife of the debtor, the courts will scrutinize the transaction very closely and any conveyance under such circumstances must clearly appear to be made in good faith and for valuable consideration. *First Nat. Bank v. Bartlett,* 8 Neb. 319. The burden of proof in such a case rests on the grantee to show a consideration not materially disproportionate to the value of the land conveyed. *McTeers v. Perkins,* 106 Ala. 411. *Contra*: *Grant v. Ward,* 64 Me. 239.

HIGHWAYS—FRIGHTENING HORSES—NEGLIGENCE.—JOHN F. DAVIS & SON V. THORNBURG, 62 S. W. 1088 (N. C.).—*Held,* that the defendants were not liable for leaving a broken-down traction engine on the side of the highway unless they had unreasonably delayed in repairing and removing it.

Most of the courts hold that such objects left within the limits of the highway, but outside the traveled way, are defects merely from their tendency to frighten horses, *Cooley on Torts, Students' Edition,* Sec. 372; *Morse v. Richmond,* 41 Vt. 435; but it is immaterial whether the object is within or without the limits of the highway. *House v. Metcalf,* 27 Conn. 631. The following objects have been held to constitute such defects: A load of machinery left by the roadside, *Bennett v. Lovel,* 12 R. I. 166; a white cloth used as a hay cap near the road, *Lynn v. Hooper,* 93 Me. 46; and a hollow log, blackened by fire, on the side of the highway, *Foshay v. Glen Haven,* 25 Wis. 288. Some courts, however, hold that an object in the highway is not to be deemed a defect for the sole reason that it is of a nature to frighten horses, *Kingsbury v. Dedham,* 95 Mass. 186; but it